TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS: FAULT OR RISK?*
Andri Tunc**
Since Sainctelette's pioneering study On Liability and Indemnity: Transportationand Industrial Accidents' was published nearly a
century ago, the question raised in the title has lost none of its
importance or timeliness. In what follows, we will attempt to
show that the apparent dichotomy should properly be resolved
by recognizing that while traffic does involve inherent risks, and
that compensation for personal physical injury should be allowed
on this basis, the element of fault - ranging from momentary
inattention to criminal negligence - must also be taken into account. This will require us to conduct our examination at three
levels, namely (1) objective facts, (2) current law and (3) a revised
law.
1.

OBJECTIVE FACTS

The issue under review is quite clear. Are traffic accidents
the realization of risk, or the consequences of faults? It would be
puerile to deny the risks of driving. An accident is, by definition,
a vexatious and essentially fortuitous event which lies largely beyond the control of the interested parties; in fact, most victims of
traffic accidents are the drivers themselves and members of their
families. Statisticians can calculate the risks involved, and tell
how many persons will be killed or injured on any given day, and
for a given set of weather conditions. They can designate peak
accident hours, and compute each driver's risk status on the basis
of sex, marital status, socio-economic category, and driving
experience.
There is, therefore, a very strong element of inevitable risk
in traffic accidents. Yet it would be wrong, and even dangerous,
to wrap up the matter without further inquiry. Certain accidents
are the result of culpable behavior that may amount to criminal
negligence. A driver who speeds through a village at 80 mph as
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children are going home from school or one who drives when
intoxicated accepts the risk of killing. Such behavior is an intentional fault, even if the driver does not intend to kill.
It is true that the cause of many accidents lies somewhere
between the error or momentary lapse in attention, which can
occur with even the most prudent driver, and criminal behavior.
The actual cause may be the error or inattention of an inept or
absentminded driver - to whom society has nevertheless issued
a driver's license. It may be an error which could have been
avoided, had the driver been more attentive to what he was doing, or had he not taken medicine which he knew would induce
drowsiness. It may have been avoided simply by eating less at
dinner, or by not driving on an empty stomach. The momentary
inattention may have been avoided had the driver been more
alert - as in the case of an overworked mother, or a scientist who
spends long hours in the laboratory, or a doctor reflecting on his
patients after a busy day.
The picture is thus a complex one, and must be subjected to
further analysis to see how an effective accident-prevention policy can be developed in terms of criminal law. In terms of civil
law, the foregoing analysis should suffice: we have seen that accidents arise from a range of causes running from statistically inevitable errors to serious faults involving manifest negligence. The
issue at hand is whether, limiting our discussion to compensation
for personal physical injury, our current law takes this diversity of
causes into account.
2.

CURRENT LAW AND POLICY

Our law considers liability in terms of both risk and fault.
There is a general recognition of inherent risk, as evidenced in
the following features of French law:
TheJand'heurdecision, 2 by which the Court of Cassation
attributed to the driver 3 a "presumption of liability,"
which in subsequent decisions became "ipso facto liability" and then simply "liability;"
The law of 1958 requiring4 drivers of motor vehicles to
take out liability insurance;
The law of 1981 automatically extending coverage to pas2 Judgment of Feb. 13, 1980, Cass. ch. roun., I DALLOZ PERIODIQUE ET CRITIQUE
57 (1930).
3 Throughout this essay, gardien de la chose, i.e., the person with legal custody of
items of property, is translated as "driver."
4 CODE DES ASSURANCES art. L-211 (1).
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sengers injured in traffic accidents; 5
The policy of the Court of Cassation tending to limit to
exceptional circumstances the cases in which the driver
may be exonerated from his liability, a policy set forth in
its last two reports to the Minister of Justice (Garde 6des
Sceaux), although advanced in a very hesitant manner.

Current law also recognizes the concept of fault, or negligence.
The guiding force of theJand'heurdecision has been waning, but it
still applies. The driver - or to be realistic, his insurance company
- is exonerated from his liability when evidence proves the existence offorce majeure, an act by a third party, or a fault committed by
the victim.
Our law thus recognizes both fault and risk, but draws the line
between them - and seeks out fault - in the strangest way imaginable. We are now quite used to seeing the courts actively seek out
the victim's fault, and this is one of the reasons there are 100,000
lawsuits a year - over 250 every day - brought before French
courts in this area. It is too often forgotten that the distinction between fault and risk is, in our law, secondary and subordinate.
The greater, and primary distinction in the relevant law is between the person who causes injury to another, and the person who
suffers the injury. The driver who injures someone is never answerable for the injury he causes, whatever his behavior, because he is
compulsorily covered by insurance. The driver thus automatically
benefits from the "risk" thesis: since driving entails risks, the driver
need not be answerable for the injury he causes.
However, the person who suffers the injury is subjected to the
"fault" thesis. The courts will attempt to reconstruct the accident in
order to find some shred of negligence - or any other event - to
establish the victim's liability and thereby deprive him of
compensation.
It is hard to see how this paradoxical treatment can be justified.
Consider, for instance, a head-on collision caused by the fault of
driver A. If driver B is killed, the accident is deemed the realization
of a risk and insurance will automatically cover the injury. But if
driver A is killed, his death is deemed to result from his own fault.
However slight his fault, and regardless of the underlying cause, his
insurance policy will not come into play. What difference does it
make if the driver leaves a widow and children? We treat him as
though he deserved the death penalty. And since it is a matter of
5 Id. art. L-I 11 (2).
6 Rapports de la Cour de
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chance that one driver is killed and. the other uninjured, so it is
chance that decides whether the collision will be handled according
to the "risk" thesis or according to the "fault" thesis. 7
"Never kill," said Alphonse Allais,8 "for you will tell lies to hide
your shame, and you might end up a hypocrite."
We civil law jurists offer advice of a different sort: "Kill and
maim!' As long as you only kill and maim, we guarantee you impunity and immunity, protection and sanctuary, and you won't even
have to come to court!'
"But woe unto the victim, woe unto the meek!' How could you
dare to bring up traffic "risks"? Abandon all hope, for we will scrutinize your behavior down to the last degree, and any error will be
held against you. The highest judges in the land will be called to
examine and determine your behavior. They've just examined the
case of a pedestrian who had both feet on the sidewalk, but they
found his shoulder extended over the curb, so they ruled he has no
right to compensation.
"And you who perish on the streets, beware!' Your fault may be
held against your kith and kin, unto the youngest generation, if your
heirs seek compensation. Reams have been written on the subject
and hundreds of decisions handed down. The Court of Cassation
has twice been convened in a plenary session, and the commentaries
on its decisions have become so subtle that they are beyond the
grasp of the uninitiated. But severity continues to carry the day."
Legal science and judicial practice have focused their attention
on the victim - not for but against him: the "negligent" victim, public enemy number one, the source of all our woes. Whoever kills or
injures pretty much disappears from the picture: whatever happens,
he will never foot the bill. He won't even have to find a lawyer, since
the insurance company will take care of everything.
At this point, a simple question may very well be in order: Are
we jurists blind to what we are doing day in, day out? As far as
7 The assertion is, of course, simplistic. The injury suffered by the driver is
subject to the constraints of physics and medicine. But these constraints are totally
indifferent to the merits of drivers. In particular, they depend on the kinetic energy
of the vehicles, hence their weight and their speed squared. They take equally into
consideration the resistance of the vehicles to shocks, hence the thickness of their
steel and interior safety features. One may further observe that the stoutness of a
driver protects him. Thus, one may say, very analytically, that a driver has more
chance to benefit from the theory of risk at the time of a collision the fatter he is
and the faster he drives a more expensive vehicle. It is regrettable, but inevitable,
that human life depends on such factors. It is more peculiar that jurists leave to
them the selection of the applicable rule of law.
8 Humoristic French writer, 1885-1905.
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equity and justice go, we certainly deserve Christ's accusation
against the lawyers of His day: "You blind gates, strainingout a gnat and
swallowing a camel."'
As far as prevention is concerned, we "deter" people (obviously
in vain) not from killing and injuring, but rather from getting themselves killed or injured. Our civil law is as efficient in this area as a
criminal law system based on trying the victim and his heirs, rather
than the criminal offenders.
The system was never intended to operate this way. No one
would have advocated laws so unjust and so ineffectual. The paradoxical current system has arisen from successive, unco-ordinated
measures.
Reformers are sometimes accused of attempting to
"destabilize" the long-established law of obligations. But the reformers are not responsible for "destabilizing" the system. Indeed,
what is left of Article 1382 of the Civil Code now that drivers are
automatically protected by compulsory liability insurance? Current
law is, from every standpoint, the world turned upside down.
In order to restore coherence to the law, it must be set rightside up again, first by letting victims benefit from the "risk" thesis,
and then, perhaps, by restoring the "fault" thesis for drivers whose
serious negligence causes injury.
3.

A REVISED LAW

In the United States, the American Insurance Association
(A.I.A.) conducted an in-depth study of the causes of traffic accidents.O It found negligence, that is to say, behavior which would
not have obtained with a person conscientious in his duties - in
less than five percent of two-car accidents and in less than ten
percent of collisions with a fixed object. The A.I.A. draws the
conclusion that it is necessary to abandon the illusion of absolute
justice, an apparition that is the source of costs, delays, and ultimately of uncertainty and unequal treatment, and instead shift to
compensating all victims without dispute.
This is the obvious conclusion, at least in principle. In a
world that fails to take account of the fault committed by a person who kills or injures, it is crazy to seek out the fault of the
9 Matthew 23:24 (Revised Standard Version).
10 Report
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person who is killed or injured. This solution can be justified on
two related grounds.
In the first place, if we suppose that the victim has committed an error or even a fault, he will be punished by the accident
itself, often in a manner cruelly out of proportion to the actual
fault. People die every day because of a momentary lack of attention. But is it the role of the law - and of insurance law in particular - to formally sanction tragedies, or to mitigate them?
Secondly, because our law fails to specify that the idea of
traffic "risk" can apply to the victim, our courts deny the very
notion of accident. They are obliged, except in the exceptional
case of force majeure, to always consider that accidents are caused
by faults. Yet a "fault" is supposed to be behavior which a normally prudent person would not engage in. Yet, as the A.I.A.
data show, ninety-five percent of collisions are the result of inadvertent acts, acts which may be caused by even the most prudent,
well-coordinated drivers. Our courts are thus bound by an inherent contradiction, a contradiction pushed to its illogical extreme
in a 1971 decision by the Court of Cassation, which considered a
pedestrian "at fault" because of his "natural reflex" in the face of
sudden danger.
Justice therefore demands that all victims be compensated
without dispute. But should we stop there? Is it proper to never
hold drivers accountable for their faults? While sharing the concern of the A.I.A. for simplicity and speed in compensation, it is
also possible to shape the revised law to provide for personal
accountability.
The first step is forjudges in accident cases to take their task
more seriously. It remains a paradox that the civil judge carefully
seeks out the victim's fault, whereas in the criminal courts each
and every judge seems to be an unreserved proponent of the
"risk" thesis. All too often, judges accept 35 deaths and 1000
injuries a day as a statistical fact of life. It cannot be overemphasized that although any driver - even a prudent one - runs the
risk of injuring or killing, certain accidents arise from criminal
behavior. In these cases, appropriate repression would be in order, with co-ordination provided by the public prosecutors'
offices.
One role of the judge in criminal court is to seek out guilt. If
a driver is found guilty of gross negligence, is it proper for him to
be fully shielded by insurance from the civil consequences of his
fault? Insurance should not cover intentional faults - and "in-
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tentional fault" certainly describes driving at twice the speed
limit or with a vehicle one knows to be defective and dangerous.
Accordingly, when the driver is sentenced to a considerable
penalty (such as imprisonment), the judge, at the request of the
plaintiff, the public prosecutor, or even at his own discretion, after consulting the defendant's attorney, should have the power to
deprive the offender of the benefit of insurance, to the degree he
may see fit in light of the circumstances, including the offender's
family responsibilities. If the offender is also a victim, he could be
allowed, for example, only part of the compensation to which he
would otherwise be entitled. The other victims would certainly
be compensated in full by the insurance company, but the judge
would be able to authorize the insurance company to claim some
compensation from the offender. Even limited use of this approach would certainly have a major impact on public opinion,
and could be a non-negligible factor in the difficult task of accident prevention.
We are convinced that in a remodeled law designed to compensate victims on the basis of risk, there is indeed room to reintroduce personal liability for fault, and that the system could
operate quite well. This is not the place to discuss its implementation, since the matter of drivers' personal liability cannot be
raised at present without encountering opposition, and that
would lead us away from the essentials.
In conclusion, let us restate the central issue. Why should
the prospect of even partially lifting the driver's insurance coverage run into virtually unanimous opposition? At the very least,
the opponents should be consistent in their reasoning. In refusing to accept that the driver can be held liable for his faults, they
want to render him harmless - in all cases - against the injury
he may cause. So how can they possibly hold the victim responsible for the injury he suffers? Theirs is indeed a paradoxical
position.
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APPENDIX
DECISION*

THE COURT: On the ground submitted to the Cour de Cassation for review, considered in its first four parts, as set forth in
the amplifying submission:
Whereas, according to the judgment under review, at nightfall, in a built-up area, Mr. Desmares's motor vehicle struck and
injured Mr. and Mrs. Charles as they were crossing the street on
foot; Mr. and Mrs. Charles brought an action against Desmares
and his insurer, La Mutualite Industrielle, seeking compensation
for their injury; and the S.N.C.F., in its capacity as a Social Security fund, and the Ardennes Health Insurance Fund intervened in
this action;
Whereas it is objected that the overruling judgment attributed liability to Desmares under Article 1384, paragraph 1 of the
Civil Code;
Whereas, after determining the factual matter,' that little
credit could be given to the statements of a witness who had not
seen the accident but only its consequences, the overruling judgment noted that Mr. and Mrs. Charles were thrust several meters
from the pedestrian crossing, and found - on the basis of the
skid marks on the road, taking account of the "reaction time"
prior to braking and of the fact that Desmares did not see the
pedestrians before the moment of impact - that the impact
could only have occurred within the pedestrian crossing or in its
immediate vicinity;
On the basis of these findings, the Cour de Cassation rules that
the appellate court did not base its decision on hearsay or on
conjectural grounds, and in properly rejecting such grounds, answered the relevant points of the submission, and thereby legally
justified its judgment on this point submitted for review.
On the ground submitted to the Cour de Cassation for review,
considered in its last two parts:
Whereas it is objected that the appellate court (i) failed to
address the submissions holding that the victims failed to abide
by Article R. 219 of the Traffic Code, which required them to
refrain from crossing the street until they had made sure they
could do so without any immediate danger; and (ii) failed to re* This judicial decision first appeared in II
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452 (1982).

It appears herein at 847 in the original French.
I Hence not subject to review by the Cour de Cassation (Translator's note).

19851

TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS

839

fute the findings of the court of first instance holding (a) that Mr.
and Mrs. Charles had further been negligent in beginning to
cross the street before making sure they could do so safely and in
failing to take account of the speed and distance of the approaching vehicle, and (b) that Desmares' automobile was too near for
the pedestrians to cross the street safely and that therefore they
should have refrained from beginning to cross the street in such
circumstances, all the more given that the car to Desmares's right
prevented Desmares from seeing them;
But whereas only in circumstances of force majeure2 can the
custodian 3 of property which causes injury be exonerated from
his liability under Article 1384, paragraph 1 of the Civil Code;
and accordingly the victim's behavior, unless unforeseeable and
irresistable, cannot exonerate such custodian, not even in part;
And whereas after noting that the accident occurred
at rush
hour, in a pedestrian crossing or in its immediate vicinity, on a
four-lane avenue with street lights operating properly, the overruling judgment found that Desmares was driving in the lefthand lane when his automobile struck Mr. and Mrs. Charles, who
were crossing from right to left with respect to the automobile's
path;
On the basis of these findings, even assuming that the victims had committed the fault they are alleged to have committed,
such fault would not constitute unforeseeable and irresistable circumstances; the Cour de Cassation rules that the appellate court
consequently was not required to seek out the existence of such
fault which, even if established, could not have exonerated the
driver from his liability, and therefore legally justified its overruling judgment;
On the grounds set forth above, the Cour de Cassation dismisses the appeal against the overruling judgment handed down
by the appellate court of Reims on January 15, 1981. Decision
handed down July 21, 1982.
2 Unforeseeable, irresistable circumstances beyond the control of the party
(Translator's note).
3 Gardien de la chose: person with legal custody of items of property; in this case,
the driver (Translator's note).

